In this case, the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Summerville SC's performance was not poor and, therefore, the lawyer's assistance remained ineffective when referring to the defendant's guilty pleas on charges of assault and threat involving the same victim during a trial on contested charges of sexual assault in which (his purpose in allowing the military judge to know the contradictory statements) was to help the judge, as an investigator, to become familiar with the way in which the expected evidence related to the contested and uncontested specifications, as described in the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Summerville SC's initial statement, and (the lawyer did not agree that a military judge could consider the allegations or their providential investigation to prove any element of the contested crimes). When a claim for ineffective legal assistance is based on the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Summerville SC's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the motion was meritorious; likewise, if poor performance is demonstrated, to demonstrate prejudice, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Summerville SC's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; a reasonable probability is a probability enough to undermine confidence in the outcome). When the primary allegation of ineffectiveness is the defense attorney's failure to competently litigate a Fourth Amendment lawsuit, the appellant must also show that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different (without the excludable evidence to prove actual prejudice). In this case, the defense attorney's performance was not poor in not advising the appellant to mention his pending sex offender status in his unsworn statement (since the defense attorney could have reasonably decided not to advise the appellant to mention sex offender registration requirements in his unsworn statement because mentioning them would lead the military judge to instruct members to basically ignore that collateral consequence when issuing an appropriate sentence for the defendant).
In this case, the defense attorney's performance was not poor in not advising the appellant to mention in his unsworn statement that if the court-martial did not sentence him to a punitive release, by regulation, the service would still license him administratively because (the regulations did not make administrative discharge mandatory when allowing a person convicted of a sexual offence to request an exemption) and (a military judge) could not determine if an administrative discharge occurred without holding a trial within a trial, and even a trial of this type within a trial could only produce a speculative result). In this case, the trial defense attorney was not ineffective in not presenting a constitutional objection based on the right to question witnesses under the Sixth Amendment or on the right to present a full defense with due process to attempt to obtain communications between a psychotherapist and the child victim (protected by the privilege between psychotherapist and patient in MRE 513, where neither allegation would have been supported by existing case law). On their own, an appellant's post-hoc statements about how he would have pleaded guilty were it not for his lawyer's deficiencies are not sufficient to establish prejudice; an appellate court must also analyze contemporary evidence to substantiate the preferences expressed by the appellant; this is because the appellant has an incentive to assert, in retrospect, that the outcome of the guilty plea process would have been different regardless of whether that statement is, in fact, true). To meet the prejudice requirement of proof of ineffective legal assistance, the appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's mistakes, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial).Assuming that the trial defense attorney acted poorly during the plea process by incorrectly informing the appellant that his pending waiver request, if approved, would overturn his guilty plea, the appellant was unbiased when there was no reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's mistake, he would not have pleaded guilty to minor crimes, thus eliminating the possibility of a conviction for the most serious crimes of which the government had compelling evidence, and instead, have run the risk of being convicted for crimes that had a maximum prison term of 12 years when the plea agreement negotiated by the lawyer limited any sentence to no more than 9 months; in addition, (the record did not reflect any compelling extenuating or mitigating circumstances that would have resulted in a reduced sentence), (the appellant understood that if he did not accept the guilty plea offer in a timely manner, he would lose the benefit of at least some of his favorable conditions) and (all members of the chain of appellants) of the command had recommended that his request for resignation be disapproved).
To prevail over a claim for ineffective assistance, the appellant has the burden of proving that the defense attorney's performance was poor and that the appellant was harmed by the error; to establish the element of deficiency, the appellant must first overcome the strong presumption that the lawyer's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and must show specific defects in the lawyer's performance that were not reasonable under current professional standards; to establish the element of prejudice, the appellant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's poor performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different). In the sentencing phase, assistance may be ineffective if the defense attorney does not properly investigate the possibility of obtaining evidence that would be valuable to the defendant when presenting a case as a mitigating or mitigating factor or, once such evidence is discovered, does not present it to the court-martial; prejudice may occur in the sentencing phase, even when the defense attorney presents several witnesses of a nature, if there is a reasonable probability that a different result, if all mitigating, has been obtained available (the evidence had been exploited by the defense). The appellate court does not need to determine if the lawyer's performance was poor before examining the harm suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; the object of a claim of ineffectiveness is not to qualify the lawyer's performance; if it is easier to resolve a lawsuit of ineffectiveness due to lack of sufficient prejudice, which usually happens, that path must be followed). In this case, although the trial defense attorney performed poorly in the sentencing phase of the trial by not presenting additional mitigating evidence of a “good soldier”, the appellant was not harmed by the deficiencies because the omitted evidence was not so transformative as to have changed the outcome when (the military judge knew from the appellant's official record book) that he had served for more than twenty years, that he deployed abroad as a helicopter pilot and that he had won numerous awards and the The judge knew from the appellant's unsworn statement that the appellant deployed to war zones, carried out dangerous missions and was injured (when the appellant's misconduct was extremely aggravating, since he committed adultery with the wife of a deployed soldier and then failed to obey the legal order of his superior not to have any contact with her).
Even if it were not reasonable for the defense attorney not to present evidence that he reasonably considered false, the appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice when the defense attorney made a courageous effort to present a defense and there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the court-martial would have been different if he had presented that evidence; the trial defense attorney, on the other hand, adequately preserved the possibility of members hesitating (without violating their ethical obligations). When the only controversial element under article 31 (b) of the UCMJ is whether the victim's lawyer questioned or requested any statement from the appellant, it must be determined whether the victim's lawyer participated in an official law enforcement or disciplinary investigation or investigation, rather than having a personal motivation for the investigation). In this case, in which the appellant alleged that his defense lawyer had not provided effective assistance in rendering judgment because his lawyer did not present mitigating and mitigating evidence when issuing the sentence and wrongly admitted the appropriateness of dishonourable freedom without his consent, the appellant did not establish the prejudice of the lawyer's ineffective assistance when (potential witnesses to the sentence had a potential anemic value), the military judge did consider that military awards and decorations and deployments in combat zones despite the lack of documentary evidence and (the Dubai record) sufficiently documented for the trial lawyer to obtain the appellant's consent to advocate for punitive freedom in an attempt to reduce the length of imprisonment imposed; under these circumstances, when the trial lawyer had also negotiated a PTA limiting the confinement to four years, where the maximum was seven years and five years was sentenced, it was not reasonably likely that the failure to present the evidence of the sentence or the sentence (the request for punitive relief would have impacted the sentence handed down).To prevail over an ineffective legal aid claim, the appellant must demonstrate that (his lawyer's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness) and (the lawyer's poor performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different without the lawyer's unprofessional errors). The appellate court must be very deferential in reviewing the lawyer's performance and must presume that the lawyer provided adequate assistance and made all the important decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment; in addition, it is limited by the principle that the strategic decisions made by the defense attorney are practically indisputable after a thorough investigation of the law and the relevant facts and the plausible options).
An appellate court does not measure the deficiency based on the success of the defense attorney's strategy in the first instance, but rather examines whether the lawyer chose an objectively reasonable strategy among the available alternatives; likewise, an appellate court must take into account that the lawyer has ample freedom to make tactical decisions; therefore, the scrutiny by an appellate court of the defense attorney's performance is highly deferential and does everything possible to eliminate the distorting effects of the retrospective, to reconstruct the lawyer's circumstances (contested conduct) and to evaluate the conduct from the lawyer's perspective at the time). An appellant is harmed by the lawyer's poor performance when there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; in the context of the capital judgment, an appellate court reweighs the aggravating evidence with all of the available mitigating evidence to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the panel returned a different sentence).Trial defense attorneys have a duty to conduct reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes certain investigations unnecessary; the strategic decisions taken by the lawyer after a thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to plausible options are practically indisputable; when considering whether an investigation was exhaustive, the appellate court does not address what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally mandatory; the idea that will require the same type and scope of research in all cases). In a capital punishment case, if the mitigating presentation of the defense attorneys for the trial was poor, to determine if prejudice has been established, an appellate court wonders if members could have placed the additional evidence on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one member would have achieved a different balance; the new mitigating evidence must differ substantially (in terms of its strength and content) from the evidence actually presented in judgment). The CAAF does not adopt the ABA Guidelines for analyzing the performance of capital punishment defense attorneys; instead, it adheres to the Supreme Court's guidance that no particular set of detailed rules for attorney's conduct can satisfactorily take into account the variety of circumstances facing the defense attorney or the variety of legitimate decisions about how best to represent a criminal defendant; examines whether the lawyer made objectively reasonable decisions (based on all circumstances of a case).
In this case, in which the appellant alleged the ineffectiveness of the attorney's assistance in the appeal, since there was no authority prohibiting the use of joint affidavits, the CCA did not abuse its discretion in authorizing the trial defense attorney to file a joint affidavit.)The CAAF has reservations about the filing of joint affidavits by trial defense counsel when an appellant alleges the ineffectiveness of an attorney's assistance; almost out of necessity, joint affidavits harmonize the memory and views of each attorney and often use the pronoun “we” to explain actions or reasoning in which only one lawyer may have participated; therefore, although the CAAF evaluates the combined efforts of the defense as a team rather than evaluating the deficiencies of a single lawyer, concludes that the best practice is for the CCAs will require that the lawyer submit individual affidavits). Defense attorneys don't act poorly when making the strategic decision to accept a risk or forgo a potential benefit (when it's objectively reasonable to do so). When examining allegations of ineffectiveness, the court need not determine if the lawyer's performance was poor before examining the harm suffered by the defendant; rather, if it is easier to resolve a claim of ineffectiveness due to lack of sufficient prejudice, that path should be followed). In determining whether there was prejudice in a claim for the ineffectiveness of the assistance of an attorney, the appellant in a guilty plea case establishes prejudice by showing that, were it not for the lawyer's poor performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial).To determine if the appellant was denied the effective assistance of an attorney, there is no need to decide the question of poor performance (when it is clear that the alleged deficiency has not caused harm).
To meet the prejudice requirement for the ineffectiveness of an attorney's assistance, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; that requires a substantial, not just conceivable, probability of obtaining a different outcome). The mere fact of being entitled to a remedy in connection with a motion waived by mistake does not in and of itself satisfy the analysis of prejudice of an ineffective legal aid demand in the context of the guilty plea; the appellant must also comply with a separate and objective investigation (he must show that if he had been properly advised, it would have been rational not to plead guilty). In this case, in which the appellant pleaded guilty unconditionally with a pre-trial agreement, even if his lawyer wrongly informed him that his previous motion to disqualify the trial lawyer remained on appeal, he could not show prejudice to support an ineffective demand for legal aid, since it would not have been rational for him to have rejected the plea offer just because he had the opportunity to change the trial lawyer's identity; even if the military judge had disqualified the trial lawyer , the nature of the evidence faced by the appellant would not have changed, the government had quite strong arguments against him, and the plea agreement allowed him to avoid a possible life sentence; the appellant did not establish a link between the disqualified trial lawyer and the manner in which the trial would have been conducted if the trial lawyer had been disqualified, even assuming that he pleaded not guilty).Under the law, as it existed when the appellant's lawyer calculated the maximum sentence, it was not a serious mistake to assert that the maximum penalty for possession of “what appears to be child pornography” could be calculated with reference to the Child Pornography Prevention Act; at the time, Beaty (70 MJ 3), who held that the maximum sentence for specifying possession “what appears to be child pornography” could not be determined with reference to the CPPA, had not been decided). The defense attorney was not ineffective in deciding not to dismiss a specification that the members had proposed to unduly reconsider after their findings were announced, when the military judge ruled that if the specification was dismissed, the appropriate resolution would be to order members not to take it into account when reaching a judgment or to declare the trial void if one or more members declared that they could not ignore it, and the defense attorney wanted to avoid the risk of annulment of the trial because he was concerned that a new panel showed less sympathy for the appellant; it was the lawyer's tactical concern about the possibility of annulling the trial that led to his decision not to have the military judge dismiss the specification; although another lawyer could have litigated this issue differently, the defense attorney's conduct was not far below the expected performance of ordinary fallible lawyers and the appellant did not overcome the presumption that the defense attorney acted competently).
To demonstrate that prejudice exists in connection with a claim for ineffective legal aid, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome). The fact that the civil defense lawyer did not cite the mental health history of a child victim from a closed facility where the victim lived before living with the defendant and his wife did not harm the defendant in his prosecution for sodomy, assault and indecent acts and, therefore, did not constitute ineffective assistance from the lawyer, since the lawyer thoroughly questioned the victim about his stay at the center and caused the victim to admit that he had told another person that he had never had sexual relations or oral sex with the defendant and that the defendant never touched her in any sexual way and obtained the acquittal of 7 of the 13 specifications for which he was accused, including all crimes for which the victim's testimony was the only evidence; the victim's mental health history, if any, would not have further discredited her to the extent that there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would have been acquitted by additional specifications).To establish prejudice under Strickland, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; in the context of a capital punishment case challenging the death sentence, an appellate court reweighs the aggravating evidence with all of the available mitigating evidence; the question is whether the members had they been able to place the additional evidence on the mitigating side of the balance, there is a reasonable probability that at least one member would have reached a different balance). Even assuming that the defense attorney was deficient in the capital murder case in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence related to the petitioner's background and social history, the petitioner was not biased, as was required to support an ineffective demand for attorney assistance, in which the defense attorney presented a mitigation case that devoted a significant degree of attention to the petitioner's troubled childhood, in which evidence that was not presented, including the testimony of a expert who explained how the petitioner's traumatic childhood did not substantially alter his sentencing profile and when the aggravating factors were overwhelming). To establish a prejudice because of the ineffectiveness of the request for legal aid with respect to the sentence in a capital punishment case, the new evidence presented by a habeas petitioner must differ substantially (in terms of its strength and content) from the evidence actually presented at the time the sentence was handed down).
The fact that the civil defense lawyer did not object to the admission of the victim's videotaped interview did not constitute ineffective assistance from the defense attorney, since the videotape was part of the defense attorney's strategy in the trial, in which he said that the victim had invented his allegations and that his statements were inconsistent, and in which he asked members to compare the video with their testimony at trial; the appellant failed to demonstrate that this strategy was not reasonable under current professional standards) .The request of the civil defense lawyer to the members to watch the videotaped interview of the victim during the deliberations was not ineffective, the assistance of the lawyer when the videotape had been admitted as evidence and was part of the defense attorney's strategy in the trial, since the victim had invented his allegations and that his statements were inconsistent, when the military judge specifically told the members that they could see the tape during the deliberations, and when RCM 921 (b) ruled that, unless the If military officers indicate otherwise, the judge, members can take with them in deliberations (any evidence admitted as evidence). The appellant's Coram Nobis petition challenging his conviction before a court-martial for not informing him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea met the minimum requirements for reviewing the coram nobis; although the appellant had served his sentence, the alleged error was most fundamental, there was no other adequate remedy because the appellant was not in custody and could not obtain redress through a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant did not seek prior redress because of the consequences His migratory allegations were not known until the government began the deportation process, the new information about the immigration consequences could not be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence before the original judgment, the order does not seek to reevaluate the evidence or legal issues previously considered and the sentence has already been served, but serious consequences persist (the initiation of a deportation process that is mainly based on the conviction of the appellant by a court martial as the basis for the deportation). The burden of establishing the truth of the factual matters relevant to the claim for ineffective assistance lies with the defendant; if there is a factual dispute over a matter pertaining to the lawsuit, the determination of whether a further investigation of the facts will be ordered is resolved in United States v.
Ginn, 47 MJ 236 (CAAF) 19. To demonstrate the prejudice caused by the lawyer's ineffective assistance in a guilty plea case, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the lawyer's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial; the focus is not on the outcome of a possible trial, but on whether the lawyer's constitutionally ineffective action affected the outcome of the guilty plea process).The appellant's allegation that he received the ineffective assistance of an attorney in court-martial proceedings when his lawyer told him that he would not face deportation if he pleaded guilty in a special court of war facially established a sufficient basis for the criminal appeals court to review his petition for coram nobis, but the decision on his petition would be premature without the government responding and considering the criminal appeals court to determine if his lawyer's performance was poor and, if so, if the appellant had prejudices cut into cubes). To demonstrate prejudice for the ineffectiveness of the assistance of an attorney, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; in demonstrating this reasonable probability, the defendant must demonstrate a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; in other words, when a defendant challenges his conviction because of the ineffectiveness of the assistance of a lawyer, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability of that, in the absence of errors, the data search engine would have had a reasonable doubt regarding guilt). The proof of prejudice that derives from the ineffectiveness of the assistance of a lawyer and the burden of proving the existence of prejudice is substantially different from the proof of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt that applies to constitutional errors, where the burden falls on the government to prove that the error did not contribute to the guilty plea; the appropriate test to evaluate the prejudice that derives from the ineffective assistance of the lawyer is to analyze all the evidence presented to the investigator to determine if the defendant has fulfilled his burden and demonstrate a reasonable probability that the investigator's decision would have been different). Assuming poor performance by the defense attorney for not consulting with the appellant about the strategic decision to plead guilty by arguing one of the crimes charged, the appellant was not biased and there was no ineffective assistance from the lawyer, when the evidence supporting the accused crimes was overwhelming, the appellant did not present a plausible defense of the admitted crime, the appellant did not argue that his defense in the trial on the remaining charges was undermined in any way by the strategic choice of the lawyer, and the judge The military gave instructions to members three times in which the lawyer's arguments did not constitute evidence).The appellant failed to prove that his defense attorney was ineffective by failing to file a timely motion to suppress admission of his BAC test, where he failed to demonstrate that he would have a reasonable chance of success in his assertion that the test violated the Fourth Amendment because his consent to blood collection was involuntary; to demonstrate prejudice in the context of this case, the appellant must provide evidence that his apparent consent was, in fact, involuntary, but there is no evidence in the file that any of the factors invoked by the appellant's attorney in fact, affected the appellant's understanding of his rights or his consent to blood collection; as a matter of law, the fact that the appellant had a BAC of.
The appellant did not demonstrate that his defense attorney at trial was ineffective by not informing him that an unconditional guilty plea would result in his demand for a speedy trial of RCM 707 and the possibility of pleading conditionally guilty to preserve the issue, since, even assuming that the lack of advice was deficient, he did not demonstrate that he would have prevailed on the issue of a speedy trial on appeal and, therefore, showed no prejudice). The appellant failed to demonstrate that his defense counsel in the trial was ineffective by not focusing the demand for a speedy trial on Article 10, in which the appellant failed to demonstrate that the government did not proceed with reasonable diligence, either with regard to the length of the delay or with respect to the reasons for the delay; consequently, the appellant failed to demonstrate that he would have prevailed in the appeal if his lawyer had followed a different strategy in the trial when filing the request for a speedy trial in Article 10, in addition to RCM 707, and therefore did not showed prejudice). The appellant did not demonstrate that his defense attorney was ineffective because he did not oppose the trial lawyer's rebuttal argument over the findings, in which his defense attorney's argument of equating the crime of indecent acts with adequate trial preparation was a questionable tactic that was clearly subject to adequate refutation by the government; although the trial lawyer's remarks were somewhat immoderate, he did not object to them, it was not conduct that was below an objective standard of reasonableness, and an objection under these circumstances would not have affected the outcome of the trial).The appellant failed to demonstrate that his defense attorney was ineffective because he did not object to the trial lawyer's argument about the judgment, in which the trial lawyer made no undue comments about the appellant's exercise of his right to plead not guilty or to remain silent; to the extent that the trial lawyer may have mispresented the evidence (if there was an error, it was neither obvious nor obvious). The appellant failed to demonstrate that his defense attorney was ineffective by not calling his wife or ex-wife to testify during the findings, when the defense attorney's affidavit provided a solid tactical reason to justify the decision not to call these women as witnesses; the defense attorney reasoned that (the credibility of the current wife was questionable at best) and, because of her juvenile appearance, her background and certain aspects of her relationship with the appellant, her testimony could instill in the members the feeling that the appellant was a man of questionable morals who was interested in younger women and (since his ex-wife was unstable, unpredictable and hostile to the defense attorney and the appellant, she could have said any number of things harmful to the appellant if she had taken the stand, including allegations that he abused her emotionally and physically).
In cases where the defense attorney's procedural tactics are violated, the appellant must demonstrate specific defects in the lawyer's performance that were not reasonable under current professional standards; the appellant must also demonstrate prejudice). The criterion for determining whether prejudice exists if the assistance of a lawyer is ineffective is whether there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's non-professional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different). An appellate court considers whether a defense attorney was ineffective and whether any errors were harmful (based on a de novo review standard). The appellant failed to demonstrate that his defense attorney's decision to call the victim as a defense witness regarding the charges of sexual abuse was deficient in the first point of the ineffective trial of assistance from a lawyer, in which, during the direct questioning of the defense attorney, the victim stated that the sexual activity was not as frequent or as extensive as described in his statement to the CID, and when the military judge's decision to declare the appellant innocent of certain crimes and modify others directly reflected the testimony presented by the victim at trial).
Assuming that the appellant had provided his defense attorney with a list of witnesses who would have testified on his behalf during the sentencing and that his defense attorney was unable to contact those witnesses, the appellant did not specify what those witnesses would have said if they had been called to testify at trial and, in that position, the appellant showed no prejudice in relation to the second aspect of the ineffective evidence of assistance from a lawyer). Assuming that the defense attorney did not consult with the appellant before filing a petition for clemency and that such performance was poor, the appellant did not provide specific information about what he or others would have submitted in support of his request for clemency and, in the absence of such information, the appellant did not demonstrate prejudice by virtue of the second point of the ineffective proof of assistance from a lawyer; in any case, after the lower court overturned the action of the first convening authority and returned his case for a In the new action, the appellant, in coordination with his new military and civilian defense lawyer, provided the convening authority with extensive documentation about his successful military career and many positive letters from family members and prison officials; therefore, no further help was justified).The repeated requests to extend the time limit of the appellate defense counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance by the lawyer for not filing the appellate pleadings in a timely manner, because the appellant was not harmed by any of these deficiencies, despite the appellant's assertion that seven years of delay in the appeal were directly due to the poor performance of the appellate defense counsel; the delay was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when there was no meritorious question in the appeal, without knowledge of significant harm stemming from the delay, and the appellant reported only 107 days of imprisonment and is likely to have been released thereafter with an appellate license). With respect to the appellant's allegation that his appellate defense attorney failed to comply with the specific obligation to submit his arguments on time, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the alleged deficiency will harm him. To prevail over the prejudice of an ineffective legal aid claim, the appellant must ultimately demonstrate that poor performance harmed the defense.) Although the appellate defense attorney who sent a letter to the appellant informing him that he had twenty days to respond should have waited a full twenty days before presenting his case to the criminal appeals court, instead of filing it four days later without a specific assignment of error, the appellate defense attorney's action did not result in harm, because the appellant never responded and, therefore, did not identify any issues he would have raised if the lawyer had waited for his opinion).The fact that the defense attorney failed to obtain the testimony of a summoned defense witness was detrimental and constituted ineffective assistance from the lawyer, since the witness's proposed testimony would have raised doubts about certain elements of the conspiracy and theft charges and, therefore, there was a reasonable possibility that without the defense attorney's error, a different outcome would have occurred).
In this case, the appellant did not prove any of the points of Strickland's test with respect to his allegations that the assistance of his defense attorney at first instance was competent in his representation and it has not been demonstrated that the appellant was harmed by the actions and advice of his attorneys; in fact, the appellant's lawyer, through the pre-trial agreement, saved the appellant from a third of the judgment handed down; the file as a whole convincingly demonstrates the improbability of the affidavit following the appellant's judgment). The appellant failed to demonstrate that his defense attorney was not effective in choosing to present the testimony of a psychologist whose appellant was suffering from PTSD when she killed her husband, arguing that the psychologist's evaluation was vulnerable because he used an outdated and inappropriate test, made computational errors in grading the evidence, and relied on outdated scoring methods; although the psychologist was a vulnerable witness, the appellant was not biased by demonstrating a specific alternative approach that should have been adopted by the team of judicial defense that would have produced testimony that would alter the outcome). The appellant did not prove that his defense attorney had not followed the recommendation of the board of sanity to contact an expert on domestic violence and women offenders, without demonstrating his prejudice; the appellant did not identify any difference that would alter the outcome between what the recommended expert would have offered and the background testimony actually presented in the trial by an expert called by defense) .The appellant did not demonstrate that the defense lawyer was ineffective in not acting during the trial to suppress the statements he made twice to a psychiatrist during meetings to treat the mental health problems he encountered during preventive detention, since there was no legal basis for suppressing his statements; in addition, the psychiatrist relied on the statements of his subsequent testimony before the government (even if the statements had been excluded, he would have given adverse testimony on the same matter). In this case, the appellant did not receive the ineffective assistance of a lawyer because there was no reasonable likelihood that the lack of a laboratory discrepancy report would have yielded a different result if the lawyer had requested a copy; there was sufficient independent evidence that the appellant had used the alleged drug so that his lawyer's failure to identify and request a copy of the report was not harmful; since the appellant had not demonstrated that his lawyer's actions had impaired the outcome of his case, he did not establish that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated).
To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance, the appellant must demonstrate that his lawyer's performance was poor and that the deficiencies were so serious that they deprived him of a fair trial; the appellant who seeks to re-litigate a trial alleging the ineffectiveness of an attorney's assistance must overcome a very significant obstacle; there is a presumption that the lawyer provided an adequate professional service; this presumption is only refuted if the specific errors committed by the defense attorney that were not reasonable are shown with in accordance with current professional standards; in addition, even when the lawyer made a mistake, the error must have been so damaging as to indicate the denial of a fair trial or a trial whose outcome is not reliable). Assuming that the defense attorney did not object to a personal data sheet admitted in the judgment with an incorrect reference to a non-judicial sanction of article 15 of the UCMJ, to meet the standard of ineffectiveness of the assistance of a lawyer, the appellant must demonstrate that, had there been no such error, there was a reasonable probability of obtaining a different result; in this case, although the error may have been evident, the appellant did not prove that the military judge or the convening authority considered him input; the lack of confidence in the erroneous information on the part of the prosecution or the staff judge's lawyer emphasized the absence of any prejudice within the framework of the simple error; due to the absence of prejudice in a simple error analysis, any deficiency in this case does not demonstrate a prejudice with respect to the question of the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance, where an even higher standard of prejudice applies).Davis, 60, MJ 469 (in this case, the defense's entire sentencing strategy consisted of preserving the opportunity for the appellant to retire under the TERA (Temporary Early Retirement Authority) and, therefore, providing support and benefits to his family; the possibility that the defense attorney for TERA trial and retirement could be counseled in this regard formed the subject and basis of the defense's sentencing strategy; the appellant relied on this advice when he requested an increase in detention instead of being fired from the Navy.; based on these particular facts, eligibility for retirement under TERA was not a collateral issue and was the subject of the Strickland v. Washington analysis because of the ineffective assistance of an attorney). In this case, the defense attorney was unaware that, under the Navy's rules and policies at the time of the trial, TERA was not an option in this case; as a result, they could not and did not properly advise the appellant; the lawyers' sentencing strategy was fundamentally flawed from the start because fundamental laws and regulations were not investigated; the appellant was misguided and there is no reasonable explanation for the attorneys not conducting a proper investigation; attorneys' performance declined to below what is normally expected of fallible attorneys; familiarity with the facts and applicable law are fundamental responsibilities of defense counsel; reasonable counsel acting on behalf of a client would have investigated the meaning and effect of TERA's conditional language before embarking on a trial or sentencing strategy; the lack of investigation of this critical component of the defense's sentencing strategy prevented the attorney from exercising informed judgment and fully informing the appellant of possible consequences of the strategy; advising the appellant and formulating a sentencing strategy based on which lawyer considered confusing the eligibility criteria for TERA was risky; not determining the real meaning of those eligibility criteria was unreasonable; such performance on the part of the lawyer was not effective; if the appellant and his lawyer had known that there was no possibility of retiring from TERA except for a secretarial exemption, there would have been little incentive for the appellant to ask for an increase in confinement to compensate for a possible punitive dismissal; following the lawyer's argument that members should maximize the appellant's detention period to preserve the possibility of his retirement, the members did just that; they estimated the maximum length of detention available; if that possibility had not been presented to the members, there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained; therefore, the appellant was harmed by the incorrect advice and strategy of his defense attorney).
If the Court concludes that any error would not have been harmful under Strickland's second point, it does not need to determine the validity of the allegations or rate the quality of the lawyer's performance (in the first point).Conflicts of interest, like other actions by a lawyer that violate the canons of legal ethics, do not necessarily demonstrate prejudice by virtue of the second aspect of Strickland; although cases involving the simultaneous representation of several clients have been treated as inherently harmful, not all conflicts between lawyers present comparable difficulties and most cases will require specifically designed analyses in which the appellant must demonstrate both deficiency and prejudice (depending on standards established by Strickland). Appellate courts have applied various approaches to the question of whether a conflict of interest should be considered inherently harmful if the conflict does not involve multiple representation; based on the precedents of this Court, the question of whether there is an inherent prejudice in a conflict between a lawyer's own interest and the client's interests must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis). According to Strickland, identifying a possible deficiency is not enough; to overcome the major obstacle presented by the second aspect of Strickland, the appellant must demonstrate a specific prejudice). In the present case, the appellant did not establish a demand for ineffective assistance based on possible conflicts between his lawyers' own interests and his interests as a client by failing to demonstrate that any of the potential conflicts turned into deficiencies so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial, that is, a trial whose outcome was reliable; the appellant failed to demonstrate the specific prejudice necessary to overcome the great obstacle established by the second aspect of Strickland).In the present case, the appellant did not establish a demand for effective legal aid based on alleged deficiencies in his lawyer's performance at trial, where none of the deficiencies would have altered the powerful importance of DNA and identification evidence in establishing his guilt; under these circumstances, any such error would not have been harmful (considering the great obstacle established by the second branch of Strickland).
Cain, 59 MJ 285 (a lawyer's violation of the canons of legal ethics does not necessarily make the attorney's assistance ineffective; most cases will require specifically designed analyses in which the appellant must demonstrate both deficiency and prejudice under the standards established by Strickland). The conduct of the defense lawyer with his client (requesting and committing homosexual acts with a military subordinate) put both the lawyer and the client at risk of being criminally prosecuted for violating the same article of the UCMJ, article 125, which was the subject of the present case; with his actions, the lawyer placed himself and his client in a position where the client's testimony involved significant risks; any analysis of the appellant's conduct would have raised the possibility that the prosecution tried, through a cross-examination or rebuttal, obtaining evidence of similar sexual misconduct; this would have created the possibility of exposing the lawyer's sexual misconduct to the appellant; under those circumstances, the defense attorney faced a conflict between his personal interests and his responsibility to provide thoughtful and dispassionate consideration and advice about the range of options faced by the defense; when faced with sexual misconduct with his client, the lawyer took his own life within hours; the the exclusively proscribed relationship we had before us was inherently judicial and created a conflict of interest per se in the representation of the appellant by the lawyer). The facts of this case are distinct from the limited and consensual relationship between a civil lawyer and his client that we consider at Babbitt, where we refuse to find that conflict per se; here, we are faced with conduct that involves the abuse of military office by a lawyer, a violation of the duty of loyalty, fraternization and the repeated commission of the same criminal offense for which the lawyer's client was tried; all of this remains unresolved, explained by the lawyer's premature death; the conflict created by this conduct was real , not simply possible and so threatening as to justify the presumption that the appropriateness of the representation was affected).Adams, 59 MJ 367 (the defendant has the right to effective representation by an attorney throughout the post-trial review period, including representation before the CCA and our Court by an appellate attorney appointed under article 70 of the UCMJ). Despite the absence of his civil lawyer's brief in the CCA, the appellant failed to comply with the prejudice component of the ineffectiveness of the examination of the assistance of an attorney established in Strickland v.
Washington, where (he was not without representation before the CCA and, therefore, was not entitled to the presumption of prejudice that would result when the lawyer was completely absent); (the only issue raised in the “missing brief”, the admissibility of his pre-trial statement), was thoroughly litigated at the trial level. The appellant is found guilty of a mess and waived any objection to the statement with respect to that mess; (the CCA was required to independently review the trial record to determine the law and facts); (the substantive brief submitted to the CCA directed that court's attention to the appellant's post-trial submission to the convening authority, a communication specifically challenging the voluntariness of his pre-trial statement); and (if the admissibility of the appellant's pre-trial statement had been submitted to the CCA in a brief prepared by a civil lawyer), the CCA's conclusion would have been no different). Quick, 59 MJ 383 (the Strickland Supreme Court established a double test to determine the ineffectiveness of an attorney's assistance; first, the appellant must show that the lawyer's performance was poor; and second, the appellant must show that the poor performance harmed the defense).The Strickland double test must be met before a constitutional violation is determined; if both poor performance and prejudice are not demonstrated, there is no constitutional violation under Strickland.) The appropriate test to determine if prejudice exists according to Strickland is whether there is a reasonable probability that, had it not been for the lawyer's error, the outcome would have been different). To the extent that the language is “reasonably probable” in the case of United States v.
In this case, given the brutally senseless nature of the crime (which includes kidnapping, rape, and robbery), there is no reasonable likelihood that, even if the defense attorney had not granted a dishonourable discharge and had advocated for 40 years of imprisonment, a different outcome would have occurred; based on the facts, there is no reasonable probability that, had it not been the error, the outcome would have been different; therefore, the appellant would not have occurred. has complied with its obligation to prove prejudice under the Strickland Test).Garcia, 59 MJ 447 (to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance, the appellant must demonstrate that the lawyer's performance was poor and that the deficiencies were so severe that they deprived him of a fair trial; the court must firmly presume that the lawyer's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the contested action could be considered a good judicial strategy). It is possible that, under certain circumstances, the waiver of an Article 32 investigation without the client's personal consent does not constitute ineffective assistance from the lawyer, for example, when there is good cause for not obtaining personal consent, a solid tactical decision, or the resulting lack of prejudice; in this case, however, we do not see such saving circumstances in which we do not perceive solid strategic reasons for the exemption itself and the record reveals no benefit to the appellant in exchange for giving for giving up his right to an investigation under Article 32; on the contrary, the record shows that the appellant was biased; he had no opportunity to hear the government's case against him and to evaluate the possible strength of that case; if he had seen the case against him before and not in the middle of the trial, he could have sought a plea agreement that would have limited his sentence; in these circumstances, we find that the action of the defense counsel in waiving the appellant's right to an article 32. The investigation without the appellant's personal consent was considerably below normal performance, which is expected of fallible lawyers and that there is a reasonable probability of obtaining a different result if such action is not taken). The extreme harshness of the sentence handed down by the members is compelling evidence that the appellant was harmed by the aggravating testimony obtained by following the course of action recommended by the defense attorney; the government requested 86 years of imprisonment and the members issued a sentence that included a sentence of 125 years, 39 years longer than the government considered appropriate; such an exceptionally harsh sentence leads us to believe that there is a reasonable probability that the defense had a different outcome than the court-martial the lawyer explored the range of options available with his client).
Dorman, 58 MJ 295 (When a client files a claim for the ineffective assistance of an attorney, the trial defense attorney must provide the appellate defense attorney with reasonable access to the case file)). Gilley, 56 MJ 113 (in the military, the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance from an attorney extends to assistance in preparing and filing post-trial matters). The defense attorney provided ineffective assistance after the trial by submitting letters to the convening authority in which he bitterly denounced the military justice system and its participants; the error was detrimental because there was a reasonable probability that, without the letters, a different outcome (or, at the very least, a significant leniency hearing) would have been obtained. Burt, 56 MJ 261 (the lawyer makes a mistake in admitting the appropriateness of punitive release when a defendant wishes to remain in the service or otherwise avoid such separation).
The defense attorney's tactical decision to reject the proposed instruction regarding the loss of retirement benefits represented a logical choice that forced members to face the difficult decision to impose a punitive leave and strip the appellant of their pay and retirement benefits without being told (and perhaps assured) that the Secretary of the Air Force could overturn his sentence and allow the appellant to retire and receive the fruits of that retirement).The appellant's affidavit, stating that he does not recall being informed of his right to request an exemption from forfeitures, failed to meet the prejudice point of the ineffectiveness of the attorney's assistance because there was no reasonable likelihood that the convening authority would have agreed to a request for exemption from forfeitures and because the appellant did not submit any evidence as to what he would have submitted or could have submitted to support his request for exemption). Terlep, 57 MJ 344 (the ineffective assistance of an attorney requires, among other things, that the defendant prove that the lawyer's performance was poor; this requires showing that the lawyer made such serious errors that the lawyer did not act as “the attorney guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”). Dewrell, 55 MJ 131 (to establish an allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must demonstrate that the lawyer's performance was poor; that the lawyer made such serious errors that the lawyer did not act as the attorney guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; that the lawyer's representation was below an objective standard of reasonableness; that the performance was not reasonable under current professional standards, taking into account all the circumstances). Judicial scrutiny of the lawyer's performance must be highly deferential; it is strongly presumed that the lawyer has provided adequate representation).The criterion of prejudice in determining the ineffectiveness of legal aid requires the defendant to prove that the lawyer's errors were so serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial (a trial whose outcome is reliable).
Although the appellant argued that defense counsel failed to take adequate measures to limit the indirect effect of certain testimonies, the supplementary instruction given by the military judge was adequate (and presumably the members followed it). While the appellant argued that the defense attorney did not do enough to inform members of the precise consequences of the punitive release, the nature of the appellant's conviction for a serious crime, the evidence presented during the sentencing, the instructions of the military judge, and the lawyer's argument demonstrate that the members had sufficient information to understand the ramifications associated with granting a punitive release to the appellant). With respect to allegations of ineffective legal assistance, the basic statements of a defendant, although made under oath, are insufficient to require a hearing; greater particularity is needed to give the claim sufficient credibility to justify a greater investment of judicial resources to determine the veracity of the claim).In evaluating allegations of ineffective legal assistance, the appellate court does not analyze the success of a criminal defense attorney's trial theory, but rather whether the lawyer chose an objectively reasonable strategy from the alternatives available at the time.) Anderson, 55 MJ 198 (to prevail over an attorney's allegation of ineffectiveness, the appellant must show that the lawyer's performance was poor and that the poor performance harmed the defense). The lawyer's ineffectiveness is a mixed matter of fact and law; factual findings are reviewed according to a clearly erroneous review criterion, but final determinations as to whether the lawyer was ineffective and whether his errors were harmful are reviewed again).
An attorney's decision not to investigate must be directly evaluated to determine whether it is reasonable under all circumstances (applying a high degree of deference to judgments). of the lawyer). An unequivocal concession of guilt by the lawyer can both undermine the adversarial process and to avoid the need to separately prove prejudice in support of a claim for the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance). Bolkan, 55 MJ 425 (when the defense of the defense attorney is lower than that required to provide the effective assistance of an attorney, the court will verify the existence of prejudice).
McConnell, 55 MJ 479 (the court refuses to address the effectiveness of the appellant's two attorneys separately or based solely on the conduct of the lead attorney; when there are several defense attorneys, the defense attorney's performance is measured by the combined efforts of the defense team as a whole). The performance and bias aspects of the test to determine the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance can be analyzed independently; the Court can evaluate the allegations of ineffectiveness to determine if there is prejudice by assuming that the alleged errors satisfy the point of poor performance (and then considering whether there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the errors, the investigator would have had reasonable doubts regarding guilt).When the appellant argued that the attorney's assistance was ineffective, in part, because the attorney failed to investigate or attack the complainant's credibility, and the appellant was unable to offer specific statements about what the witnesses would have said regarding the victim's credibility, the Court could not reliably assess whether the outcome of the trial would have been different if such evidence had been presented and, therefore, the appellant failed to fulfill his burden of showing prejudice). When the appellant argued that the assistance of a lawyer was ineffective, in part because the lawyer did not use solid military evidence, the lawyer's decision to relinquish that evidence on the merits in order to preserve his strength to pass judgment had a reasonable tactical basis; although the appellant may disagree with the decision in retrospect, it was not below the objective standard of reasonableness). When the appellant alleged the ineffectiveness of the attorney's assistance, in part, because the lawyer failed to file an in limine motion to prevent members from listening to the testimony of explicit sexual conversations that the appellant had with the victim of his crime, the appellant did not bear his burden of proving prejudice because the victim's testimony and the appellant's admissions before the trial, when compared to the victim's references to the appellant's sexually explicit observations, there is no reasonable evidence that if there were excluding statements, the investigator would have had reasonable doubts about the appellant's guilt).
When the appellant alleged the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance, in part because the lawyer did not make an initial statement, or because the appellant failed to fulfill his obligation to prove prejudice (when, in the light of the evidence against the appellant, there was no reasonable likelihood that the members would have had reasonable doubts about their guilt if a initial statement). Steele, 53 MJ 274 (since the appellant did not submit any question of competence stemming from the civil lawyer's “inactive attorney status”, and since the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the civil lawyer's performance was otherwise poor, the appellant failed to shoulder the heavy burden of proving that he was denied the ineffective assistance of an attorney). Normally, the ineffective assistance of a lawyer in the sentencing phase is detrimental and requires a new sentencing hearing (because the file does not contain the evidence that an effective lawyer would have presented). When the new lawyer interviewed the relevant witnesses and made a post-trial presentation to the convening authority that resulted in a substantial reduction of the sentence, the convening authority adequately addressed any harm that the appellant may have suffered as a result of his lawyer's poor performance during the sentencing phase of the trial).
Knight, 53 MJ 340 (the right of a military defendant to the effective assistance of an attorney after the trial is a fundamental right). In cases where a service member is effectively unrepresented during the leniency process, the court will presume that he has been the subject of prejudice). Paaluhi, 54 MJ 181 (allegations of ineffective legal aid are re-examined; to prevail, the appellant must show that his lawyer's performance was poor and that this deficiency seriously harmed the appellant's defense). The appellant was hampered by the ineffectiveness of the lawyer's assistance when the lawyer advised him to talk to a government clinical psychologist and confess to having committed the crimes charged, and confessions were used against the appellant at trial; a confession is an extremely devastating form of evidence and the other evidence against the appellant was not overwhelming; therefore, there was a reasonable probability that, without admitting the appellant's inculpatory statements to the clinical psychologist, the members would have a doubt reasonable with respect to the appellant's guilt).
Thompson, 54 MJ 26 (when the allegations contained in the appellant's affidavit are such that, if true, they would support a legally justiciable allegation of ineffective legal aid, and when those allegations leave too many factual questions about the effectiveness of the defense attorney unresolved in the file, it is necessary to obtain affidavits from the defense attorney on the appellant's allegations and then determine if a hearing was necessary in Dubai). The defense attorney must conduct a reasonable investigation or make the reasonable decision that an avenue of investigation is not necessary; not investigating the existence of a possible alibi witness is poor performance that can be detrimental in light of the specific weaknesses of a given accusation). Although the lack of communication between the defense attorney and the appellant meant that the convening authority was not contacted on behalf of the appellant through a request for clemency, the appellant cannot demonstrate how he was harmed in the post-trial leniency process (in light of the seriousness of the crimes, the appellant's refusal to plead guilty to any of the crimes, and the appellant's poor military record). Lee, 52 MJ 51 (the right to effective representation extends to post-trial proceedings, in which the defense attorney is responsible for tactical post-trial decisions, but must act after consulting with the client if possible and appropriate, and cannot bring matters despite the client's objection).
The criteria for prejudice in the event of errors in post-trial representation is low due to the highly discretionary nature of the convening authority's leniency power, and the appellant only needs to make some colorful demonstration of the possible prejudice resulting from the error).Magnan, 52, MJ, 56 (the file corroborates the reason why the defense attorney did not comment on an erroneous statement made by the trial judge's lawyer in the post-trial recommendation that the military judge had not recommended a pardon because the appellant, in an unsworn statement, requested discharge for misconduct). The appropriate standard for the ineffective assistance of an attorney requires both that the defense attorney was objectively deficient and that there was a reasonable probability that a competent lawyer would have led to a different outcome. The above evidence was presented in Strickland v. In dissent, Judge Thurgood Marshall objected that Strickland's double test was too permissive with regard to the lawyer's poor performance, and that the point of prejudice, when applying a form of harmless error review, would deny redress to defendants who did not receive a fair trial, but for whom there was other evidence of their guilt. Scholars have often argued that the poor quality of the appointed attorney jeopardizes the right to an attorney, as guaranteed by Gideon v.
The ineffective assistance of an attorney, commonly known as “IAC”, is a legal term that refers to the inadequate performance of an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case. It constitutes a violation of the defendant's right to an attorney enshrined in the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a fair trial with effective legal representation. When an attorney's performance does not meet standards considered reasonable, and this deficiency hurts the defendant's case, it may be a reason to argue that the attorney's assistance is not effective. The Strickland test sets a high standard for establishing the ineffectiveness of an attorney's assistance, since it requires demonstrating poor performance and consequent prejudice. Courts are cautious about challenging strategic decisions made by defense attorneys and generally grant them a degree of deference.
Demonstrating the ineffectiveness of an attorney's assistance can be a complex and challenging task. As established by the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate both poor performance and the resulting prejudice. This requires extensive documentation, legal analysis, and often expert testimony to establish that the lawyer's actions or omissions had a significant impact on the outcome of the case. The ineffective assistance of an attorney is a critical issue in criminal law, as it affects the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice system.
The historic Strickland v. Washington case established a double test that serves as a cornerstone for evaluating the IAC's demands, setting a high standard for demonstrating the existence of a poor representation and the existence of prejudice. Understanding the importance of Strickland and the challenges involved in proving the IAC is essential for anyone navigating the criminal justice system. In this case, the trial defense attorney was not ineffective in not presenting an exception for child abuse to the privilege between psychotherapist and patient of MRE 513, in addition to the exception of obligation to report that the lawyer did raise with respect to an accused of sexual abuse of a child (when the two exceptions were indeed coincidental because applicable Florida law required reporting any knowledge or suspicion that a child had been a victim of sexual abuse).
When the appellant alleges that the assistance of an attorney in the appeal was ineffective, the CCA is authorized to compel the trial defense attorney to file affidavits.) The guilty plea is a critical stage of litigation (in which the criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance from a lawyer). Alabama, the Supreme Court declared the action of an attorney ineffective when he did not request funding for a better ballistics expert, even though he was legally authorized to do so. In the United States, a lawyer was declared ineffective when he did not object to the miscalculation of the sentence imposed on the defendant by the judge. Therefore, lawyers cannot be ineffective if they do not anticipate future developments in the reliability of evidence or future changes in legislation.
The defense attorney's decision, during the sentencing, to refer to the previous “good soldier” testimony given by a witness during the final part of the trial, instead of calling the witness to testify at the time of sentencing, did not constitute ineffective assistance on the part of the lawyer (when the defense was able to avoid the risk of cross-examination)). When a lack of institutional oversight causes a case to languish on appeal, the appellant is effectively denied his legal right to free and timely professional assistance from a military lawyer specializing in appeals).
